How Putin’s war is causing global instability

WHEN TWO elephants fight, the grass suffers, goes the proverb. But what happens when a big bear attacks a smaller creature and comes off worse? Traditional sayings offer little guidance. Nonetheless, this is a crucial question for medium-sized powers in 2023. The bloody nose Ukraine is giving Vladimir Putin changes many geopolitical calculations.

If Mr Putin loses, some countries that fear Russia, such as the Baltic states, will fear it less. Others will worry that a defeated Russia might be even less predictable. Mr Putin has not directly threatened Kazakhstan, which like Ukraine has a long border with Russia and a large Russian-speaking minority. But nationalist Russian pundits urge him to dismember it, seizing land to “protect” ethnic Russians from imaginary persecution. Their lies about Kazakhstan bear a scary similarity to the ones they tell about Ukraine: that it has biowarfare labs near the Russian border, for example, and that it is planning to ban Russian-language teaching in schools. However the war in Ukraine ends, Kazakhs will have reason to be nervous.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suggests that no country that has ever been ruled from Moscow is safe. Those that can forge closer ties with NATO will do so: Georgia and Moldova are keen. Those that cannot realistically expect help from NATO, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, will seek deeper ties with China. If there are Chinese railways and factories on their territory, they assume, Russia will be less likely to attack them. The only regimes likely to draw closer to Russia in 2023 will be its fellow pariahs, particularly Iran, which needs a friendly trading partner and a buddy on the un Security Council.

Regimes that depend on Russian support will grow more nervous. Belarus’s despotic ruler, Alexander Lukashenko, has clung to power largely thanks to Mr Putin’s backing. In return, he allowed Belarusian territory to be used as a launchpad for the Russian attack on Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, which failed dismally. Mr Lukashenko is eager not to be sucked more deeply into the war, which is hugely unpopular with Belarusians and intensifies the scorn they feel for their election-rigging president. But Mr Putin will keep pressing him.

In Africa, Wagner, a mercenary outfit run by a Putin crony, props up autocratic governments in the Central African Republic and Mali and backs a warlord in Libya. These operations are probably self-financing through murky minerals deals. But some of Wagner’s thugs have been called to fight in Ukraine. If its African operations ever lose the tacit support of the Russian state, they will struggle to keep their clients in power.

Energy producers will see their diplomatic clout enhanced for as long as the war disrupts energy markets. Cash-flush Saudi Arabia will feel little real pressure to improve its human-rights record or diversify its economy. Suppliers of alternatives to Russian gas will thrive. Europe is showering money on Qatar, a big exporter of liquefied natural gas. Egypt, which once quarrelled with Qatar over its support for Islamists, is now cosying up to it in the hope of financial support.

Political ripples from high food and energy prices will continue

Political ripples from high food and energy prices will continue. They have already contributed to protests and riots in many countries, and to the overthrow of Sri Lanka’s president. Even if food prices moderate somewhat in 2023, expect unrest in places such as Pakistan and Tunisia, where people blame unpopular governments for empty plates. Trouble is even likelier in countries where poor economic policies have aggravated the damage and fraught elections are scheduled for 2023, such as Nigeria and Turkey.

The latter is an unusual case. Diplomatically, Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, hopes to take advantage of the war in Ukraine no matter how it unfolds. If Mr Putin loses and Russia is seriously weakened, a power vacuum may open in places Turkey cares about, such as Syria and the south Caucasus. If Russian backing for Armenia wobbles, Mr Erdogan will intensify his support for Azerbaijan, which has been fighting Armenia over territory.

If the Ukraine war drags on, Mr Erdogan will continue to play both sides. He will expect rewards from Moscow, such as cheap gas, for welcoming Russian money and tourists. He will also sell more weapons to Ukraine, and demand credit from the West for denying Russian warships entry to the Black Sea. And if Mr Erdogan loses an election in June, his successor will probably take a similar approach to foreign policy.

Overall, Mr Putin’s humiliation in Ukraine will make autocrats everywhere wary of starting wars of conquest—and doubly so if defeat leads to his downfall. All the more important, then, for Ukraine’s backers to redouble their support. Aggression must not pay, and must be seen not to pay. The world will be more peaceful in the long run if Mr Putin loses.■

Robert Guest: Foreign editor, The Economist

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition of The World Ahead 2023 under the headline “How Putin’s war is causing global instability”