Israel faces the danger of fighting on a second front

AS ISRAEL ORDERS an evacuation of Gaza and prepares to invade it there are ominous signals on its northern border with Lebanon, where the opening of a second front would dramatically complicate Israel’s military position and escalate the conflict. Speaking from Lebanon on October 13th Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, said there was “every possibility” of a second front if Israel’s blockade of Gaza were to continue. The fighters of Hizbullah, the Iran-backed Shia militia based in Lebanon, are gung-ho. “Imagine what we could do,” says a commander just back from Lebanon’s border with Israel. There are “game changing” plans to cross the border, he says, and capture the Galilee and northern Israel. Israeli strikes on Hizbullah would be returned by Hizbullah rockets, destroying Tel Aviv “tower for tower”. Israel’s nuclear reactor is a far easier target, he says, than Iran’s nuclear installations are for the West.

Hyperbole perhaps, but some Lebanese are preparing for war. Southerners clog roads heading north and in Beirut people queue for petrol. At night a city famed for parties is a ghost town. “Death is a cup from which we all have to drink,” says a driver, quoting the Prophet Muhammad. Hizbullah has already traded missiles with Israel and a handful of troops on both sides have been killed. Both sides are reinforcing: Israel in the hope that it can deter an attack. The risk of miscalculation is growing, says a United Nations observer in southern Lebanon, who has repeatedly run to his bunker each day for a week. The Shia militia could be waiting for Israel’s invasion of Gaza—just as it did in 2006, when it launched an attack two weeks into Israel’s ground operations in Gaza. Like Hamas, Hizbullah seeks an uprising against the Palestinian Authority (PA), the administration in the West Bank, which both groups see as a corrupt tool of the Israelis. “Nothing will remain of the PA,” says the commander.

In its war with Hizbullah in 2006, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) were shocked by the group’s professionalism and high-quality weaponry. The guerrillas of the 1990s had morphed into something resembling a conventional army, capable of mounting complex, “swarming” attacks against poorly trained IDF tank forces. Since then Hizbullah’s capabilities have made another leap. In 2006 it fired almost 4,000 rockets at Israel over a month. Now the group’s stockpile of rockets and missiles has grown tenfold to 150,000 or so. Many are hidden among the banana plantations that have replaced the orange groves across southern Lebanon.  They have “the capacity to overwhelm a lot of Israeli defences”, says Fabian Hinz, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a think-tank.

Moreover, in 2006 Hizbullah’s arsenal largely consisted of inaccurate rockets. Over the past decade the group has acquired precision-guided missiles, with Iran’s help, some capable of landing within ten metres of their target, according to Hizbullah. These could strike Israeli bases and critical infrastructure in ways that Hizbullah could not in the last war, says Mr Hinz. It also has long-range anti-ship missiles—Chinese-inspired ones modified by Iran—that could target Israeli vessels. Hizbullah has fought in Yemen, Syria and Iraq. “We’re battle-hardened,” says the commander. “Unlike Israeli cowards. They don’t fight on the ground.”

Will Hizbullah act? It appears to be weighing several factors, perhaps why its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, delayed a speech widely expected on October 10^th. One is the fragile state of Lebanon, which is suffering from an economic and financial implosion that has seen its currency lose 98% of its value. Hizbullah is immune from this in a narrow sense: in order to evade American sanctions it runs a parallel financial system and pays its fighters in dollars, on time. But many Lebanese fear that the Shia, once the country’s underdogs, will drag them into another war. Hizbullah has to consider its place in the country. Some non-Shia politicians say they are sceptical it will attack.

And a key consideration is the appetite of Hizbullah’s patron, Iran, for a regional conflict. Iran’s foreign minister, Mr Amirabdollahian, has said that the Hamas attacks were “spontaneous and entirely Palestinian”. Western governments say they have no evidence that Iran directed the Hamas attack. Still, according to the Hizbullah commander, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is providing logistical support in Lebanon. Iran’s decision making has become more hardline. Since president Ebrahim Raisi took over from Hassan Rouhani in 2021 he has filled his cabinet with former generals. A similar trend has occurred in other places where Iran holds sway. Pro-Iranian militias dominate Iraq’s government. A military commander recently replaced a civilian as head of Hamas’s administration in Gaza and a reshuffle of power among Houthi rebels in Yemen has seen militants come to the fore. By allowing Hizbullah to open a second front with Israel, Iran would hope to kill off the Abraham accords between Israel and some Arab countries and spark an anti-Western surge across the Middle East.

Against this, many believe that Iran wants to preserve Hizbullah’s rocket arsenal in order to deter an attack on Iran’s nuclear programme. And outside powers are a source of restraint on Iran and by extension Hizbullah. China, Iran’s largest trading partner, is very unlikely to support a regional war that would force up oil prices, which are already rising towards $90 per barrel. The arrival of an American aircraft-carrier strike group off Lebanon’s coast has also concentrated minds. President Joe Biden was speaking to Hizbullah and Iran when he said, “To any country, any organisation, anyone thinking of taking advantage of this situation, I have one word: Don’t. Don’t.” Are they listening? Part of the militia’s strategy is to keep Israel permanently on edge. “See you in Kiryat Shmona” are the parting words of the Hizbullah’s commander, referring to an Israeli city over the border. He did not say when.■