Jaroslaw Kuisz on the testy relationship between Poland and Ukraine

“WHY IS THE election campaign so fierce?” a Scandinavian journalist asked me recently. His face reflected genuine amazement at the aggressive rhetoric of Polish politicians, towards each other and their counterparts aboard, in the run-up to the general election on October 15th. At the time, the world’s media were full of stories about a conflict over Ukrainian grain, which the Polish government was refusing to allow to cross its border, and reports that Poland was no longer sending weapons to Ukraine.

The deterioration in Polish-Ukrainian relations was dramatic. A few months earlier Andrzej Duda, the Polish president, had bestowed the Order of the White Eagle—one of his country’s highest honours—on Ukraine’s leader, Volodymyr Zelensky. But at the UN General Assembly in September, Mr Zelensky claimed that “some friends in Europe” were playing into Russia’s hands. Mr Duda answered that “a drowning person is clinging to anything available”.

Why have relations soured? And was confrontation between Poland and Ukraine inevitable?

Twenty months ago, things looked very different. When Russian forces invaded Ukraine on February 24th 2022, an exodus of refugees to Poland started literally overnight. To the astonishment of many, the Polish authorities, known for their muscular attitude towards refugees from Syria or Afghanistan, immediately unlocked the frontier and admitted anyone in need. Soon afterwards, Poland became one of the main cheerleaders for military support for Ukraine, not only delivering weapons but also putting pressure on hesitant Western allies, in particular Germany. To many, this seemed all the more striking given the tortured history between Poland and Ukraine, with flare-ups stretching back centuries.

This solidarity was to a large extent built on historical fear of Moscow. Given Russia’s past expansionism, and its continued desire to extend its sphere of influence, the people of Poland, Ukraine and numerous other central and east European countries share a particularly nervous attitude to statehood—a phenomenon I call “post-traumatic sovereignty”.

That the solidarity has frayed in recent months is down to a number of factors. First, Poles have begun to suffer from aid fatigue. After the outbreak of full-scale war Ukrainians got access to Poland’s labour market, health care, education and social assistance on an equal footing with Polish citizens. Over time, some of them became competitors for jobs. Amid severe economic challenges, including high inflation, the image of refugees is changing, all the more so since the end of the war is not in sight. Almost 40% of Poles now say they would like to abolish their country’s special aid package for refugees. Disquiet has been stoked by Konfederacja (Confederation), a far-right political alliance whose support hovers at 10%, according to opinion polls.

The second factor is the changing dynamics of Ukrainian politics. Worn down by 20 devastating months of war, Mr Zelensky and his government have begun to adopt a more bitter tone in statements referring to some of Ukraine’s neighbours and allies. With Russia targeting stockpiles, grain is a particularly sensitive issue.

Third, Polish politics has become cut-throat during the election campaign. The current populist government led by Law and Justice (PiS) is fighting for a third term. It is not far enough ahead in the polls to be sure of one: PiS’s support is at 36%, six points ahead of the (centrist) opposition Civic Coalition. So the government is nervous. Its desire to cling to power has a whiff of desperation: if it loses the election, some of its politicians may face criminal charges for violations of the rule of law, including steps to undermine judicial impartiality and transparency.

It is in this context that Ukrainian grain became an election issue. After the invasion of Ukraine, Poland promised to help transfer grain across its territory. Recently, however, it was discovered that, for reasons that are unclear, a significant portion never made it farther and was sold on the Polish market. The impact on grain prices irked Polish farmers, whose votes PiS covets. Farmers make up only around 4% of the population but another 36% live in rural areas, and many of them care about agricultural livelihoods. PiS has been courting this vote, especially in eastern Poland. It is also wary of being outmanoeuvred by Konfederacja, which rejects the policy of solidarity with Ukraine.

Moreover, ordinary Poles’ solidarity with Ukraine has been dented by their changing views of Russia’s military might. The war has exposed its military weakness in many areas. Many central and east Europeans no longer see Russian forces as unstoppable on the battlefield. Although almost three-quarters of Poles remain concerned about the hypothetical spillover of the war beyond Ukraine, they are increasingly preoccupied with day-to-day issues such as the cost of living and their creaking health-care system.

As Polish politicians look beyond the election, they too have other considerations. For years, Poland’s foreign policy has been built around the fact that it is the largest EU and NATO member in central and eastern Europe. Ukrainian membership of either organisation would change that. Regional competition is never far from political minds, and not only in Poland: Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Mr Zelensky, said in a recent interview that Poland and Ukraine would be in competition with each other in numerous spheres after the war and that Ukraine would “defend its interests”. If Russia emerges from the war weakened—potentially sparking a Copernican revolution in foreign affairs in eastern Europe—that rivalry could intensify.

Nothing is certain. The war is far from over. An election victory for Poland’s centrist opposition might lead to more delicately handled diplomatic relations with Ukraine. Donald Tusk, the leader of the opposition (and a former prime minister), recently convened a meeting with other opposition figures and experts on how to resolve the crisis in relations between the two countries. They declared that, with the government “bouncing from wall to wall…guided by political interest”, Poland is “losing a historic opportunity for good relations with Ukraine”. The outcome of the election on October 15th will determine the balance of competition and co-operation in one of Europe’s most important bilateral relationships.■

Jaroslaw Kuisz is editor-in-chief of Kultura Liberalna and the author of “The New Politics of Poland: A Case of Post-Traumatic Sovereignty”.