Ukraine has a fighting chance in 2023

NOBODY CAN say when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will end—or how. But months of fighting have stamped five sets of tracks into the Ukrainian earth and, one day, these will converge on peace. Even allowing for the fortunes of war, the best gauge of the future is to trace their paths.

The first track is Ukraine’s sustained advantage on the battlefield. Russia has more than three times the population of its neighbour and is trying hard to destroy infrastructure in Ukraine and degrade it as a functioning state, but Vladimir Putin will struggle to train, equip and supply an army capable of occupying the four Ukrainian provinces he has annexed. The more he presses reluctant Russians into combat, the more dead bodies he will have to account for and the more he will struggle.

By contrast, Ukraine is well placed to muster committed troops and tactically shrewd officers, supplied with arms and intelligence by NATO countries. Perhaps, after wearing down Russian defensive positions in the south and in the Donbas region, Ukrainian forces will repeat the lightning-fast seizure of occupied territory in the east and south that they managed in September and October. But even if they cannot, they should be able to continue their slow advance.

From a Ukrainian point of view, it is vital that they do. On its own, momentum will not win the war, but it is the foundation for everything else, including the second track: steadfast Western support for Ukraine’s efforts. Mr Putin calculated that the West would abandon Ukraine, or at least force it to settle for an unequal peace. He has therefore tried to deal with battlefield reverses by cutting off gas supplies to Europe and warning of nuclear war.

These threats have backfired, by persuading Western governments that humouring Mr Putin would be dangerous. Giving in to the Kremlin today, as in 2014 when Russia first attacked Ukraine, would only set the stage for the next conflict. Western arms will therefore continue to flow eastward and Russian gas will never again flow westward in large amounts. This winter will be hard—and the next could be even worse, especially if Chinese demand for energy revives, pushing up the price of oil and gas. Yet, for as long as Ukraine is advancing on the battlefield, European resolve will last.

The third track involves the rest of the world. China continues to support Russia in a hands-off way. India and many developing countries have stood back, irritated by demands that they sign up to the West’s agenda when the West all too often ignores their own. However, even here Mr Putin is losing support. He received a lukewarm reception from his fellow leaders at the summit of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation in September. In October, in a vote in the UN General Assembly on the Russian annexation, Mr Putin suffered his biggest defeat since the invasion.

Neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians are yet ready to lay down their arms

These first three tracks are converging on the fourth: growing international pressure to end the fighting. In these straitened times, the war is hard to afford. The OECD, a club of mostly rich countries, estimates that it will cost $2.8trn in 2023. Shortages of arms in the West will become an increasing concern. Expect, therefore, lots of talk in 2023 about the scenarios for peace.

The trouble is that neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians are yet ready to lay down their arms. Mr Putin will either want to fight on, betting that he can mount an offensive and regain the momentum, or freeze the conflict, with the aim of preventing Ukraine from becoming a prosperous and peaceful European democracy. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, flushed with success, has vowed to take back all the territory his country has lost since 2014. Western countries insist Ukraine alone should decide when to negotiate. In reality, though, they are the ones paying for the war. At some point they will apply pressure.

The war ends in Moscow

The timing of that moment will probably be determined by the fifth and most uncertain track. For peace to be stable, something must change in Moscow. Its nuclear weapons mean that a surrender cannot be imposed on the Kremlin by force of arms. Instead Russians will have to grasp the truth that Mr Putin is squandering their lives in a futile, unwinnable war.

Mr Putin could resort to chemical or nuclear weapons—though even that would not clear the path to a Russian victory. More likely he will cut his losses in a bid to cling to power, or be abandoned by the elites. The year will begin with Mr Putin hoping for something to turn up: momentum to shift on the battlefield, Chinese military aid, the splintering of European unity or the prospect of a re-elected Donald Trump abandoning Ukraine. Mr Putin knows anything is possible in war. But he must also know that the tide is against him.■

Edward Carr: Deputy editor, The Economist

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition of The World Ahead 2023 under the headline “Ukraine’s fighting chance”